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Abstract
Social media sites are becoming a key factor in
politics. These platforms are easy to manipulate
for the purpose of distorting information space to
confuse and distract voters. Past works to identify
disruptive patterns are mostly focused on analyz-
ing the content of tweets. In this study, we jointly
embed the information from both user posted con-
tent as well as a user’s follower network, to detect
groups of densely connected users in an unsuper-
vised fashion. We then investigate these dense
sub-blocks of users to flag anomalous behavior.
In our experiments, we study the tweets related
to the upcoming 2019 Canadian Elections, and
observe a set of densely-connected users engag-
ing in local politics in different provinces, and
exhibiting troll-like behavior.
1. Introduction
There have been multiple recent studies on how social net-
works have been manipulated to foster divisions among
people, and the tactics used for information operations. Wil-
son et al. (2018) define Information Operations as the suite
of methods used to influence others through the dissemi-
nation of propaganda and disinformation. The aim is to
paralyze the decision making abilities of individuals, thus
making the public vulnerable. With these operations at
large, democracy stands threatened. A case in point is the
2016 US Presidential Elections which are believed to have
been swayed through social media by interference from Rus-
sian trolls and bots (Badawy et al., 2018). This was further
validated by Twitter in 2018, when they reported possible
engagement of 1.4 billion users with suspected “trolls” from
the Russian government funded Internet Research Agency
(Policy, 2018).
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Figure 1. Sample Memes used by Suspicious Anomalous User in
Cluster #8 and its Follower Network Location
Twitter is one of the most commonly used platforms to mo-
bilize public at the time of political unrest. Therefore, it
is imperative that we develop tools to identify Information
Operations at an early stage, leading to a healthy demo-
cratic society. Towards this goal, we analyze the activity
on Twitter related to the upcoming elections in Canada, to
proactively monitor the interactions on this platform. The
main contributions of the current work are:
• We create a joint autoencoder based solution to the
problem by formulating Information Operation detec-
tion as dense sub-block detection on binary attributed
graph, which encodes both the content of tweets and
the connections in the Twitter follower network. The
dense sub-blocks are detected using density-based clus-
tering on learned node embeddings of the graph.
• We design an adaptive hyperparameter selection
method by generating task-specific synthetic data, thus
solving the problem of lack of objective evaluation
standard for this unsupervised anomaly detection tasks.
• We demonstrate the application of our solution to real-
world data by identifying a sub-block of suspicious and
tightly connected users, as well as a suspicious account
exhibiting behaviors related to Information Operations.
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2. Data Collection
In this paper, our main focus would be to study the political
interactions of Twitter users surrounding Canadian 2019
Federal Election, and identify groups of users that seek
to disseminate crafted messages (propaganda). The dataset
comprises of 38,498 tweets from 7,298 distinct Twitter users.
The tweets were collected using the Twitter Streaming API,
using the following hashtags - #Trudeau, #TrudeauMustGo,
#cdnpoli, #TrudeauResign, #LavScam, #SNCgate, #Stand-
WithTrudeau. We also collected the list of followers for
each of the 7,298 users in our dataset to construct a follower
network, resulting in a total of 474,459 connections. The
hashtags are further formulated as a vector of size 3,047
to represent the attributes of each node or user, denoting
whether the user used a certain hashtag in the dataset. We
represent the entire data as concatenated adjacency and at-
tribute matrix as shown in Figure 4.
3. Method
Definition 1 (Binary Attributed Graph). A binary at-
tributed graph G = (V, E ,X) consists of: (1) the set of
nodes V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, where |V| = n; (2) the set
of edges E , where |E| = m; and (3) the binary node at-
tribute matrix X ∈ {0, 1}n×d, where the ith row vector
xi ∈ {0, 1}d, (i = 1 . . . n) is the binary attribute informa-
tion for the ith node.
Definition 2 (Binary Attributed Graph Dense Sub-
-block). For a binary attributed graph G = (V, E ,X) and
a density threshold t ∈ [0, 1], t-induced dense sub-blocks
are set of tuples {(SV ,SX)} where SV is subset of nodes V
and SX is subset of binary attributes of X, such that: (1)
subgraph induced by SV : SV(V, E) has network density
above t, and (2) bipartite graph induced by top nodes SV ,
bottom nodes SX and edges Eb, has network density above t,
where Eb correspond to activation of binary attributes. We
denote adjacency matrix of G by A, attribute matrix by X.
We represent our data as a Binary Attributed Graph with
adjacency matrix A encoding follower relations and binary
attribute matrix X encoding user hashtag usage. We are in-
terested in detecting binary attributed graph dense sub-block.
Our approach to tracking Twitter political interactions and
potentially identifying Information Operations is a 3-fold
process: (1) learn node embeddings using joint autoencoder
to minimize reconstruction error of the adjacency matrix
and attribute matrix and preserve pairwise Jaccard distance
of input vectors, (2) apply density-based clustering on the
node embeddings, (3) conduct manual inspection of filtered
clusters.
3.1. Joint Autoencoder
Our joint autoencoder architecture is inspired by (Wang
et al., 2018), where we extend their loss functions to deal
with joint information of attribute and adjacency matrix.
Definition 3 (Joint Autoencoder). A joint autoencoder
shown in Figure 5 is characterized by (φeA, φ
e
X, φ
e
J, φ
d
A, φ
d
X)
where φ can be a function represented by a single layer of
neural network or composition of multiple layers, φe is en-
coding function and φd is decoding function. Subscripts of
φ :A,X,J denote the information φe encodes from or φd
decodes into, where A and X are adjacency and attribute
matrix of G defined previously, and J is concatenated la-
tent representation of them: concat(φeA(A), φ
e
X(X)). De-
coders φdA and φ
d
X transform joint latent representation J
to approximation of A,X : Aˆ, Xˆ.
The joint reconstruction error weighted by hyperparameters
wA and wX, with attention weights WAatt and W
X
att is
calculated by
H = φeJ(J) (1)
LArecon = ||(φdA(H)−A)WAatt||2F (2)
LXrecon = ||(φdX(H)−X)WXatt||2F (3)
Lrecon = wALArecon + wXLXrecon (4)
Besides reconstruction loss, we define similarity loss as the
discrepancy between pairwise Euclidean distance of H and
pairwise Jaccard distance ofA andX, weighted by the same
wA and wX. In order to compare these 2 different distance
metrics, we apply a logit transformation on the pairwise
Euclidean distance to compress its range to [0, 1], the same
as the range of pairwise Jaccard distance. Let SXJar be the
pairwise Jaccard distance of rows of X, similarly SAJar for
A, and SHEuc be the pairwise Euclidean distance for latent
vectors H, and choose λ ≥ 0:
LAsim = ||exp(−λSHEuc)− SAJar||2F (5)
LXsim = ||exp(−λSHEuc)− SXJar||2F (6)
Lsim = wALAsim + wXLXsim (7)
The joint loss to minimize is weighted combination of re-
construction loss and similarity loss with weights wrecon
and wsim, plus L2 regularization loss at every layer:
Ljoint = wreconLrecon + wsimLsim + Lreg (8)
In practice, we train on sampled batches instead of the
entire data matrix. For each epoch, we select node vi ∈ V
uniformly at random, and sample set of nodes {vj : vj ∈
{V − vi}} according to some distribution D related to the
similarity between vi and vj .
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3.2. Density-based Clustering
We transform the problem of dense sub-block detection of
the binary attributed graph to density-based clustering of la-
tent embeddings of nodes in Euclidean space, thus enabling
the use of established density-based clustering algorithm
such as DBSCAN (Ester et al., 1996), as well as making
the process more interpretable. We first apply dimensional-
ity reduction using Uniform Manifold Approximation and
Projection (McInnes et al., 2018) on H to get Hreduced
with 2 dimensions, and then apply DBSCAN on Hreduced
with parameters that cater to the size of the clusters that
we are interested to study. Then we define dense clusters
as clusters that induce subgraphs of Twitter follower net-
work whose network density is above a specified threshold.
In practice, we look at the top k densest clusters returned
by DBSCAN. The motivation for using network density to
indicate anomaly is related to Wilson et al. (2018)’s defi-
nition of Information Operations: we aim to study densely
connected users exhibiting similar hashtag usage, thus po-
tentially showing similar attitudes towards certain events or
ideologies, which is indicative of the presence of Informa-
tion Operation.
4. Experiments
We first conduct synthetic experiments to choose the best set
of hyperparameters for exploratory analysis on real data, as
well as to demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm on
binary attributed graph dense sub-block detection compared
to FRAUDAR (Hooi et al., 2016), a classical baseline for
dense sub-block detection with only adjacency matrices, and
DOMINANT (Ding et al., 2019), a Graph Convolutional
Network (GCN) based approach that utilizes both adjacency
and attribute matrices. We then create a joint “fingerprint”
of identified clusters based on both the graph topology of
cluster-induced subgraph, and attributes of nodes in the
cluster, which could potentially be used to identify Infor-
mation Operations in Canadian 2019 Federal Election. We
also manually inspect the nodes in the three clusters with
highest cluster-induced network density, and find some sus-
picious accounts that might have engaged in Information
Operations.
4.1. Hyper-Parameter Tuning
We inject artificial dense sub-block anomalies into our Twit-
ter data in order to tune our algorithm to perform well for the
unsupervised anomaly detection task. With the injected data,
we conduct a random search of the hyperparameter space
and identify the best hyperparameter option by F-1 score,
with labels being anomaly or non-anomaly. Then we use it
to identify interesting dense clusters on the real data without
dense sub-block injection. We show that our method outper-
forms both baselines across all injected sub-block densities
in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Synthetic Experiment Performance
4.1.1. SYNTHETIC DATA GENERATION
For adjacency matrix, we inject dense subgraph by injecting
random dense graph with a specified density and size at
sub-block indices. For attribute matrix entries, we create
an empirical distribution of hashtag usage indicating how
likely a random person from a sub-block would use certain
hashtags, and apply add-k smoothing on this empirical dis-
tribution. Next, we sharpen the distribution by applying
an exponential factor to it: exp(λ ·) where λ controls for
how concentrated the transformed distribution is. By sam-
pling a certain number of hashtags from this distribution,
we simulate the presence of Information Operations, where
a group of highly connected users tweet a subset of hash-
tags. Finally we inject the bipartite graph with the specified
density at these sub-block and attribute indices. For our
experiment, we inject 3 dense sub-blocks of size 500, and
use the same network density for both adjacency matrix and
attribute matrix, from 0.1 to 0.5 with 0.05 interval.
4.2. Results
Using the best hyperparameter option, we create 10 clusters.
For each cluster and its corresponding induced sub-graph of
follower network, we generate hashtag fingerprint, which
reflects user attribute information, as well as clustering fin-
gerprint, which reflects key network topology information.
We put our focus on 2 of the densest clusters (#9, #1), and
report interesting exploratory findings.
For each cluster, we define hashtag fingerprint as the relative
usage frequency of popular hashtags within cluster. Note
that usage here refers to whether a hashtag is used or not
in the dataset for a given user, and frequency refers to the
number of users in a cluster using certain hashtag. A high
relative usage frequency corresponds to highly used hashtag
in a cluster. Hashtag fingerprints for cluster #9 and #1, and
a randomly sampled set of users are shown in Figure 3.
Similarly, for each cluster-induced subgraph of the follower
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Figure 3. Hashtag Fingerprint: Per-cluster relative usage frequency for popular hashtags
network, we define clustering fingerprint (shown in Figure
6) by the probability density of node clustering coefficients
in the subgraph. Clustering coefficient of each user captures
the connected-ness of its neighbors.
By analyzing the hashtag fingerprint we note that cluster
#9 exhibits interesting spikes on hashtags related to diverse
locations: Alberta (#ableg), British Columbia (#bcpoli),
Quebec (#polqc), Toronto (#topoli), Saskatchewan (#skpoli),
New Brunswick (#nbpoli), Manitoba (#mbpoli) and Ottawa
(#ottpoli). This is counter-intuitive; we normally assume
people engage with each other locally, but we clearly see
multi-regional cluster of users in close contact with each
other.
For cluster #1, the hashtag usage centers around a recently
heated political scandal related to government and corpo-
rate corruption (#LavScam), and a few prominant political
parties: the Liberal Party of Canada (#lpc), the Conserva-
tive Party of Canada (#cpc), and the New Democratic Party
(#ndp). This reflects the fact that an emergent cluster of
users related to different political parties are talking about
the recent scandal.
The hashtag fingerprint for both clusters identified through
our algorithm reveals interesting insights that would other-
wise be hard to obtain by going through the tweets manually.
On the other hand, the hashtag fingerprint of a random sam-
ple is highly centered around the most popular hashtags and
cannot yield much insight into the user group.
Inspecting clustering fingerprints in Figure 6, both cluster
#1 and #9 exhibit a more spread-out distribution compared
to random sample. In particular, cluster #9 where tweet
hashtags are related to diverse locations exhibits clustering
coefficient distribution centered around value (0.1 to 0.2)
higher than what we would expect for such a multi-regional
cluster. To investigate the reason for such phenomena is an
interesting direction of future empirical study.
4.2.1. SAMPLE USER
We finally manually inspect the Twitter profile page of users
in top 3 densest clusters (#8, #9, #1), and for each cluster,
we visualized its cluster-induced subgraph and per-node
HITS authority score (Kleinberg, 1999). We use darker
green gradient to denote nodes with higher HITS authority
score.
Shown in Figure 1, we identify one Twitter account high-
lighted with a dotted red line that exhibits behaviors sus-
picious of Information Operations. The suspicious user
account was created in August 2017. Since December 2017,
the user started consistently creating and spreading divisive
tweets and memes that demote Justin Trudeau and his ad-
ministration. A sample of the political memes deployed
by this user is shown in Figure 1. Furthermore, this user
changed it user handle twice from mid-April to mid-May.
Such high frequency of changing user handles might be re-
lated to malicious intent (Jain & Kumaraguru, 2016). Both
the identified user’s posted content and behavior are suspi-
cious of engaging in Information Operations.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we proposed an embedding based solution to
track Twitter political interactions and potentially identify
anomalous user groups. This approach is built on the recent
advances on representation learning for graphs and hence
provides a scalable solution for this domain. We contribute
three key insights: (1) Information Operations detection
on Twitter can be formulated as a dense sub-block detec-
tion problem on binary attributed graphs that encode both
network topology and user attribute information; (2) dense
sub-block detection can be formulated as a density-based
clustering problem on latent Euclidean embeddings of the
nodes in the graph; (3) each cluster identified by the algo-
rithm can be assigned a joint fingerprint that yields insight
which is otherwise not possible through manual inspection
of tweets. For code and more information see https:
//sites.google.com/view/jointdetect/
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Figure 4. Concatenated Adjacency and Attribute Matrix
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Figure 5. Joint Autoencoder Architecture
Figure 6. Clustering Fingerprint: Per-cluster probability density
for node clustering coefficients
